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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DOUGLAS TROY MCGINMS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20050141-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from consolidated sentencing for convictions on pleas to 
possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8 (West 2004); attempted possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West 2004); two 
counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37A-5 (West 2004); and following too closely, no proof of insurance, 
and two counts of driving on a suspended license, all class C misdemeanors, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.. §§ 41-6-62(1), 41-12a-303.2, 53-3-27 (West 2004), respectively. 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 
2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: 
la. Did the sentencing judge abuse his discretion when, after determining that 
defendant's lengthy and egregious criminal history and defendant's conduct in the instant 
cases outweighed the remaining relevant sentencing factors, the judge sentenced 
defendant to prison rather than probation and ran the sentences in these two consolidated 
cases consecutive to each other? 
lb. Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance by failing to inform the 
sentencing judge of allegedly mitigating information of which the judge was already 
aware? 
lc. Did the trial court commit plain error by failing to correct counsel's omission 
of redundant information? 
Standard of Review: 
"A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its 
discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that 
exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993). 
"'[T]he exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of 
the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
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In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must 
determine whether trial counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether the 
deficient performance prejudiced defendant. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 
687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991), cert denied, 843 P.2d 
516 (Utah 1992). The claim is a question of law, reviewed on the record of the 
underlying trial. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, fflf 16-17, 12 P.3d 92. To prevail 
on a claim of plain error, defendant must demonstrate that the trial court erred, that the 
error should have been obvious, and that, absent the error, he had a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable outcome. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
When both claims turn on the same set of facts, "a common standard is applicable." State 
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989). Both claims require that defendant 
establish prejudice or harm to the extent that the reviewing court's confidence in the 
outcome is undermined. See id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004), is attached hereto as 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from the consolidated sentencing in two cases involving the 
same defendant. 
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Case No. 031800097: 
On June 24, 2003, defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor; and driving on a suspended license, a class C misdemeanor (097: 1-
2).1 He was released on bail prior to the preliminary hearing and failed to show up for 
two subsequent scheduling conferences in September and October (097: 11, 13, 77-81, 
84-85). At a January 15 pre-trial hearing, defendant rejected a plea offer, and the parties 
thereafter appeared for trial on January 21, 2004 (097: 87, 96-97). 
With the jury ready and the trial poised to begin, defendant entered last-minute 
guilty pleas to all three charges (097: 96-98; R. 167: passim). Defendant was again 
released on bail, and failed either to contact Adult Probation and Parole ["AP&P"] or to 
appear at his March 22 sentencing (097: 100-01, 105-11, 122). The court issued a 
warrant, and defendant was eventually arrested and appeared in court on October 5 (097: 
116-17). Sentencing was set for December 13 (id.). 
Case No. 031800147: 
On September 21, while he was out on bail in the previous matter, defendant 
committed additional drug offenses. He was charged with possession of a controlled 
lrThe appellate record contains a pleading file for each of the two cases from which 
this appeal arises. Case No. 031800097 was the first of the two cases to be filed, and 
citation to the pleadings file in that case will be (097: page #). Citation to the pleadings 
file in Case No. 031800147 will be (147: page #). 
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substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute, a second degree felony; 
possession of drug paraphernalia, driving on a suspended license, and driving without 
proof of insurance, all class B misdemeanors; and following too close, a class C 
misdemeanor (147: 1-3). He was released on bail, appeared for his November 17 
preliminary hearing, and was bound over for trial (147: 14-15, 19, 22-23, 28-29, 42-44).2 
Thereafter, he failed to show for a December 15 status hearing and failed to keep multiple 
appointments with his counsel (147:46-47). The court issued an arrest warrant (147:47, 
49-50). 
On January 26, defendant entered A Iford pleas to attempted possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute—reduced to a class A misdemeanor—and to 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (147: 108-10).3 He pled guilty 
to the remaining misdemeanors as charged (id). 
He was again released on bail on March 22, 2004, failed to appear for sentencing 
the same day, and failed to contact AP&P, as ordered (147: 120, 125-26, 128-29, 140). 
Another arrest warrant was issued (147: 131-32). Defendant thereafter appeared in 
custody for an October 5, 2004, hearing, and sentencing was set for December 13 (147: 
148-49). 
2The preliminary hearing was held only in relation to the first two counts (147: 29). 
The parties stipulated that no preliminary hearing was necessary on the three 
misdemeanor charges in counts 3, 4, and 5 of the information (id.; R. 197:4). 
3No written plea affidavits appear in the record in either case. 
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December 13, 2004, Sentencing for Both Cases: 
The recommendation from AP&P included probation and various programs (R. 
168:2-3).4 Defense counsel acknowledged defendant's "lengthy criminal history" and 
defendant's numerous "errors in judgment," but claimed that his client "finally gets it" 
and that he "is participating wholeheartedly in the [CATS] drug program" and trying to 
"clean up his life." (R. 168:2)(a copy of the sentencing transcript is attached in 
Addendum B).5 
The prosecutor voiced serious concern over what he termed "one of the worst" 
criminal histories he'd ever seen (R. 168:3). He noted that defendant was paroled six 
times, each of which was revoked because of continued drug use or commission of new 
offenses (id). He noted the crimes defendant had committed in the five months leading 
to sentencing and that defendant had continued his drug use while out on bail from the 
instant cases (id.). He then requested prison on the felonies (id.). 
Defendant made a lengthy statement, apologizing for his behavior, explaining that 
he now realized how many people he'd let down over the years, acknowledging his 
"pretty horrible" past, claiming that his priorities had changed, and promising that he was 
now committed to changing his life (R. 168:3-5, 10). 
4A copy of the presentence report was not included in the appellate record, 
preventing inclusion of detail concerning AP&P's recommendation and defendant's 
criminal history. 
5The CATS program is not defined by the appellate record. 
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The sentencing judge noted defendant's "horrible record" going back to 1974, 
pointed out his bad track record for probation, parole, and prior programs, and 
commented that as far as the criminal system went, defendant had "failed in every 
conceivable way" (R. 168:5-6). He explained: 
I thought about this a lot. I have great - and I've been put in a position by 
Judge Christiansen's decision and the probation officers decision to recommend 
probation, but all I really have at this point in time is your representation that you 
have turned the corner. And while you're impressive, put up against your prior 
record, and given the fact that I'm sure that you've made those representations in 
the past. In fact, you talked about conning your - your probation officer in the 
past. What I do know is that throughout your life you have not obeyed the law. 
You didn't obey the law in this case. You didn't come out and keep your court 
appearance. 
So the question I have to ask myself is am I willing to ignore everything 
here and accept the recommendation and your statement that that's all behind you, 
and I guess I'm not. 
You know, I just - I've been thinking about this and when I read the 
presentence report I said to myself and made a note I don't know how I'm going to 
not send this guy to prison based upon all of the record because after all we only 
have your statement as to what you intend to do. And believe me, I've heard them 
all and your statement actually is believable, but I need to recognize that I can't 
ignore the reality of the record and the happy thought that somebody has finally 
turned the corner. 
I'm glad after all these years that I could at least entertain the thought of 
giving you probation. I think that is a happy observation about the state of my own 
soul that I haven't grown so tainted, but I'm not going to give you probation. 
(R. 168:5-10). 
The court then sentenced defendant in the first case to a prison term of zero to five 
years for the third degree felony, and jail terms often days and six months for the 
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misdemeanors of driving on a suspended license and possession of drug paraphernalia, to 
be run concurrent with each other (097: 141-45; 147:164-69; R. 168:10-11). In the 
second case, he sentenced defendant to one year in jail for attempted possession of a 
controlled substance, six months in jail for possession of paraphernalia, and ninety days in 
jail for each of the three remaining misdemeanors, to be run concurrent with each other 
(zd.)(one order was prepared for both cases; a copy is attached in Addendum C). The 
judge then ran the sentences in each criminal case consecutive to each other and 
concurrent with sentences imposed in another matter (id). 
The judge explained his reasoning one last time: 
I wish as I often do that I knew that I was doing the right thing. I'll confess 
to you that I have great conflict as to whether or not this is the right thing to do. 
But after looking at your record and after looking what happened in this case my 
mind has overcome my heart and I think that this is an appropriate sentence. I 
have reduced these things. I have made them concurrent to Judge Christiansen's 
sentence so that you can get credit. You don't have to come out of jail and start 
[t]his over again. Don't get out of prison that is. My own - one of the factors that 
I took into consideration is that I would probably give you more time here in 
Uintah County Jail than I would than you would have to spend in the state prison 
given the situation out at the prison. 
(R. 168:11-12) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 031800097:6 
Defendant was seen driving on a public highway by an officer who knew that he 
had a suspended driver's license (097: 12). Two officers followed him into KKR Storage 
and found him standing next to his truck with the truck running (id). They arrested 
defendant for driving on a suspended license and called a tow truck to impound the truck 
(id.). They conducted an inventory search prior to towing and found a baggie of 
methamphetamine and syringes in an eyeglass case in the pocket of defendant's shirt on 
the front seat of the truck (id; R. 168:9-11). 
Case No. 031800147:7 
Officer John Crowley stopped at the stop light near Starvation Bridge to 
investigate why people ahead of him had left their vehicles (R. 197:5-6). Defendant 
claimed that he had stopped behind a van, fallen asleep, and rolled into the van (R. 
198:15). The officer requested a check on the truck driven by defendant and found that it 
was registered to defendant but was not insured (R. 197:8-9; R. 198:8-9). Defendant was 
driving on a suspended license at the time (R. 197:7; R. 198: 14-15). The officer obtained 
permission to search the truck and thereafter impounded it (R. 197: 9-11, 22). 
6Neither a preliminary hearing nor a trial occurred in this case. The presentence 
investigation report was not made a part of the appellate record. Hence, the facts have 
been gleaned from the plea hearing, the sentencing hearing, and the pleadings. 
7No trial occurred in this case, but a preliminary hearing was held and the 
transcript was made part of the appellate record. 
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During the search, a glass pipe and a vial containing 4.7 grams of 
methamphetamine that was still wet was found behind the truck's radio (R. 197:12-13, 
19-20, 32; R. 198:8-9, 12-13). Defendant claimed to have sold the truck to the person 
riding with him and claimed that the items belonged to that person (R. 197:8, 10, 24; R. 
198:8-9, 12-13). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the sentencing court abused its discretion by sentencing him 
to prison rather than probation and by running the sentences in each of the two cases at 
hand consecutively. He did not preserve his claims below, but argues both ineffective 
assistance and plain error on appeal. He claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to inform the sentencing court of: 1) defendant's reliance on a 
promise made to him that he would receive concurrent sentencing if he entered his pleas; 
2) the statutory factors relevant to concurrent and consecutive sentencing; and 3) the 
benefits to be achieved by defendant's involvement in a drug-treatment program. The 
sentencing court committed plain error, he argues, by failing to correct defense counsel's 
deficient performance. 
Defendant's arguments fails for multiple reasons. First, he provides no record of 
any sentencing promise. Accordingly, this Court must presume the regularity of the 
proceedings below and reject his claim that the promise existed and was a relevant factor 
to be considered at sentencing. Second, where the record is inadequate, defense counsel 
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will be deemed to have performed effectively. Third, an inadequate record will not 
establish the obvious error required for defendant's claim of plain error. 
Fourth, the information defendant claims his counsel failed to provide to the 
sentencing court was already in the court's possession and factored into the sentencing 
decision. The court's comments demonstrated cognizance of the statutory factors relative 
to it concurrent and consecutive sentencing decision. The judge was also aware of 
defendant's involvement in and professed commitment to the CATS drug treatment 
program, with the obvious objective of pursuing a drug-free life. The judge's 
consideration of probation and belief that perhaps defendant had "finally turned the 
corner" demonstrate his consideration of the benefits to be derived from continued drug 
treatment programs. Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to expressly provide 
redundant information to the court. 
Fifth, defendant's claims of ineffectiveness and plain error share a "common 
standard" in that they both require a showing of prejudice in order for defendant to 
prevail. Here, both claims fail because defendant is unable to establish prejudice from 
counsel's failure to provide the sentencing court with information the court already 
possessed and used in making its sentencing determination. Thus, even if defense 
counsel had expressly proffered the redundant information, defendant would have 
enjoyed no greater probability of being sentenced to probation rather than prison or to 
concurrent sentences in both cases. 
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Finally, a sentencing court has no obligation to favor rehabilitation over 
punishment when fashioning a sentence, and sentencing recommendations are not 
dispositive. Where the trial court evaluated the evidence and imposed a proper statutory 
penalty, the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to prison rather than 
probation or in running the sentences in each case consecutively. 
ARGUMENT 
THE SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION 
WHEN, AFTER FINDING THAT DEFENDANT'S LENGTHY 
CRIMINAL HISTORY AND CONDUCT IN THE INSTANT CASES 
OUTWEIGHED THE OTHER SENTENCING FACTORS, HE 
SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO PRISON RATHER THAN 
PROBATION AND RAN THE SENTENCES IN ONE OF THESE 
CONSOLIDATED CASES CONSECUTIVE TO THOSE IN THE 
OTHER CASE 
Defendant challenges the sentencing court's sentencing decision. He argues that 
the sentencing judge abused his discretion by sentencing defendant to prison rather than 
granting probation and by running the sentences in both cases consecutively to each other. 
See Aplt. Br. at 2, 7-11. Specifically, he claims the court failed to consider: 1) 
defendant's reliance on a promise that he would be given concurrent sentences if he 
resolved both cases and consolidated them for sentencing purposes; 2) statutory factors 
relevant to concurrent and consecutive sentencing; and 3) defendant's participation in an 
in-patient treatment program. Id. He claims that if the sentencing judge had properly 
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considered these factors, he would have imposed probation and run the sentences in both 
cases concurrently.8 
A. Defendant's Claim Fails For Lack Of Proof That the Plea Agreement 
Included A Promise of Concurrent Sentencing 
Defendant argues that the sentencing court did not take into consideration his 
reliance on a promise allegedly made to him that if he resolved both cases and 
consolidated them for sentencing, he would receive probation and concurrent sentences in 
both cases. Aplt. Br. at 8-10.9 
1. Lack of record support. 
Defendant does not challenge the validity of his pleas but simply seeks a new 
sentencing hearing, in part, to permit the court to consider as a sentencing factor his 
reliance on an unenforceable promise allegedly made during plea negotiations. Id. at 7-
11. His claim fails, however, for lack of record support. 
8Defendant does not claim that the sentences "exceed[] legally prescribed limits." 
State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993). He acknowledges that they do not. 
See Aplt. Br. at 9. 
9Defendant failed to raise any of his appellate claims at sentencing. Consequently, 
they are not properly before this Court on appeal. See State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, \ 14, 
46 P.3d 230 (stating preservation rule generally); State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1033 
(Utah 1994) (applying general rule in the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings). 
However, he has argued both ineffective assistance of his counsel and plain error on the 
part of the sentencing court for each claim. Accordingly, the State addresses each claim. 
See State v. McCloud, 2005 UT App 466, ^ 6 (defendant may obtain appellate reveiw of 
an issue raised for the first time on appeal in only three instances: plain error, ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and exceptional circumstances); see also State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 
49,1f 18, 531 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (same). 
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"[Defendant] is ultimately responsible for ensuring that [the appellate court] 
receive[s] all portions of the record necessary to his arguments on appeal." State v. 
Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App.1998). Where the record is inadequate on 
appeal, this court "must assume the regularity of the proceedings below." Id. (quotations 
and citation omitted); see also State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam) (concluding that in the face of "an inadequate record on appeal, [we] must 
assume the regularity of the proceedings below." (citations omitted)), abrogated on other 
grnds by State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772 (Utah App. 1990). 
Defendant has provided no record evidence to support his claim that any 
sentencing promise was made below. He merely points to the absence of any written plea 
affidavit to support his claim that the promise was made, implying that no such document 
was drafted in order to keep the promise from the court's attention. Aplt. Br. at 8. 
However, a plea affidavit is not required for entry of a valid plea, and the absence of the 
document does not presuppose an improper plea bargain. In this case, the pleas in one 
case occurred "at the last minute" after the jury was seated on the first day of trial with no 
plea negotiations and no time to generate the usual supporting affidavit of defendant (R. 
167:2,17). 
Instead, the record reflects complete and thorough colloquies for both sets of pleas, 
demonstrating that defendant was not acting in reliance on any such sentencing promise. 
When defendant entered his pleas in each case and was asked about the existence of any 
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promises as to sentencing, he replied that none had been made (R. 167:5; R. 198:3). At 
both points, the court told defendant that any such promise "would not be binding upon 
the court[,]" and defendant replied that he understood (id). The sentencing judge 
explained to defendant not only the maximum sentences possible for each count, but the 
fact that "all of the[] sentences may be consecutive so you would add each sentence 
maximum in order to get the maximum amount you may serve and you may serve them 
consecutively with the other matters you're set to be sentenced on" (R. 198:11). Further, 
defendant addressed the court at sentencing without making a single reference to any 
sentencing promise, and he made no objection when the court announced the consecutive 
sentencing (R. 168:3-5, 7-8, 10-13). Neither did defendant file any post-judgment motion 
seeking to bring the matter to the court's attention. 
Given the complete absence of any record support for defendant's claim of the 
existence of a sentencing promise, and a clear record refuting the claim, defendant cannot 
establish error, plkain or otherwise. 
2. Ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Defendant also argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to 
bring to the court's attention "defendant's detrimental reliance on the promise of 
concurrent time[.]" Aplt. Br. at 10. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing of deficient 
performance and prejudice. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, fflf 16-17, 12 P.3d 92. A 
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claim of plain error requires a showing of obvious legal error and prejudice. See State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). "Failure to satisfy either prong will result in our 
concluding that counsel's behavior was not ineffective." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 
288, 1f 38, 55 P.3d 1131, cert denied, 63 P.3d 104 (Utah 2003). 
"Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies 
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed 
effectively." Litherland, 2000 UT 76,^ f 17. Defendant's failure to establish the fact of the 
promise renders him unable to establish any deficient performance in his counsel's failure 
to present the alleged promise to the sentencing court. See id.; see also Fernandez v. 
Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) (".. . proof of ineffective assistance of counsel 
cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality"). His failure to 
establish the first prong of the test for ineffective assistance defeats his claim. See Diaz, 
2002 UT App 2884 38. 
3. Plain error. 
Finally, defendant makes a blanket claim that the trial court committed plain error 
by "failing to correct the attorney's error[s]." Aplt. Br. at 2. This Court need not reach 
the claim because defendant fails to include an express argument of plain error with 
respect to the alleged sentencing promise, in violation of rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. See State v. Vigil, 922 P.2d 15, 25-26 (Utah App. 1996) (declining 
to address an appellate argument where the argument did not comply with the court's 
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briefing rule); State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1008 n.5 (Utah App. 1994) (same), 
abrogated on other grnds by State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997), reh }g denied 
(Mar. 24, 1997); see also State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, \ 35 n.5, 27 P.3d 1115 (refusing to 
address an evidentiary claim on appeal, in part, where defendant cited only to the rule 
without providing supporting argument). Moreover, the claimed error could not be 
obvious to the sentencing court where defendant admits that the court had no knowledge 
of the sentencing promise. See Aplt. Br. at 8, 10. 
B. The Sentencing Court Considered The Relevant Statutory Factors and 
Rendered An Appropriate Sentencing Decision; Defendant Establishes 
Neither Ineffectiveness Nor Plain Error In His Counsel's Failure To Provide 
Redundant Information 
1. Relevant statutory factors and drug program. 
Defendant challenges the decision of the trial court to deny probation and sentence 
him to consecutive prison terms, a decision that is "within the complete discretion of the 
trial court." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991). Defendant argues 
generally that the sentencing judge "did not take into consideration the statutory 
provisions for concurrent time." Aplt. Br. at 8-10. He also contends that the judge failed 
to adequately consider the benefits of drug treatment programs, defendant's involvement 
in an "intensive" in-patient drug treatment program at the time of sentencing, the fact that 
he expended "considerable effort" to get into the program and to succeed in it, and the 
fact that he was "doing well" in the program. Id. at 8-9. In other words, defendant 
believes that his convenient, last-minute, self-proclaimed change of heart and desire for 
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rehabilitation to help him overcome his drug habit should have garnered him probation or 
at least concurrent sentencing of his two cases. Id. at 8. However, the sentencing judge 
accepted defendant's claim that he desired to change, provided ample record of his 
consideration of all remaining relevant factors, determined that the factors weighed in 
favor of imprisonment, and imposed a just and reasonable sentence under the 
circumstances of this case. 
A court has no obligation to favor rehabilitation over punishment when fashioning 
a sentence. A trial court acts well within its discretion in determining that imposing a 
prison term represents a more just disposition than probation, notwithstanding the 
recommendation of AP&P. See, e.g., State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 
1993) (no abuse of discretion where trial court emphasized punishing defendant rather 
than rehabilitating him). Further, defendant is not entitled to probation simply because a 
third party recommended it. See State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957) 
("Probation is not a matter of right, and this is so no matter how unsullied a reputation 
one convicted of a crime may be able to demonstrate to the trial judge"). Rather, "the 
court is empowered to place the defendant on probation if it thinks that will best serve the 
ends of justice and is compatible with the public interest." Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051 
(citation omitted). Finally, '"[t]he granting or withholding of probation involves 
considering intangibles of character, personality [,] and attitude . . . '"Id. at 1049 (citation 
omitted). 
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The statutory factors to be considered in determining whether to run sentences 
concurrently or consecutively include "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (West 2004). Add. A. The sentencing judge was well 
aware of these statutory factors when he made his ruling below and mentioned those 
factors relevant to this case. 
The overshadowing factor for the sentencing judge was defendant's "horrible" 
criminal record and his conduct in the cases before the court (R. 168: 5-6, 7-9). 
Defendant was forty-two years old at sentencing (R. 168:5-6). His criminal record began 
around the age of twelve and continued over thirty years (id.). He had been given 
numerous opportunities throughout the years, including probation, parole, and treatment 
programs, and "failed in every conceivable way" (R. 168:3, 6). He had been given parole 
six previous times, and each opportunity resulted in revocation due to "continued drug 
use or committing new offenses" (R. 168:3, 6-7). His was "one of the worst" criminal 
records the prosecutor had seen (R. 168:3). The judge expressly recognized that he could 
not "ignore the reality of the record" despite being impressed by defendant's statements 
(R. 168:3, 9). 
In addition, the judge noted defendant's failure to appear in court in both these 
cases when he was out on bond and acknowledged defendant's admission that at those 
times, he continued using drugs (R. 168:6-7). In fact, defendant entered his pleas in 
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January 2004, but was not sentenced until December 2004 largely because of his repeated 
failure to appear in court. The sentencing judge recognized that while he hoped 
defendant had sincerely determined to grow up and stop using drugs, he simply could not 
rely on defendant's word for it in the face of defendant's criminal history and his conduct 
throughout this case (R. 168:7-11). 
Finally, the sentencing judge knew about and considered defendant's involvement 
in a drug treatment program. Both defendant and his counsel informed the court of 
various aspects of defendant's participation in the CATS program (R. 168:2, 4-5, 9). 
Aplt. Br. at 9. Defendant himself mentioned the program no less than four times in his 
remarks to the sentencing court, stressing that he got into the program on his own 
initiative, not that of a judge, that he had been in it a "couple of weeks," and that he was 
leader of one of the groups (R. 168:4-5). He explained that the program includes a six-
month aftercare program, a subsequent three-month follow-up program, frequent 
urinalyses, and an intensive outpatient program, all of which is funded by defendant (R. 
168:9). Defense counsel noted defendant's "wholehearted[]" participation in the program 
and his "sincere goal" to complete it and to make needed changes in his life (R. 168:2). 
In addition, defendant gave an impassioned and candid monologue about his less-than-
admirable past, his mistakes, the effect of his actions on those around him, and the fact 
that, through these most recent court cases, he "finally grew up" and decided to turn his 
life around without the use of drugs (R. 168:3-5). 
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The sentencing judge listened to the statements, found them to be "impressive" 
and "believable[,]" and acknowledged that he had considered probation as an option (R. 
168:7, 9). His comments made it clear that his sentencing decision encompassed all the 
relevant statutory factors, including defendant's entire criminal history, his prior record of 
failing at every rehabilitative opportunity given him, the part drugs played in the instant 
offenses and in defendant's criminal history, and the importance of defendant's apparent 
desire to turn his life around and get help with his drug problem. The judge's awareness 
of the statutory considerations is also apparent in his inquiries concerning whether 
defendant was on parole at the time he committed the relevant offenses and his comment 
that it "makes a difference" in the sentencing decision (R. 168:7). See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-401(3) (directing consecutive sentencing if "the later offense is committed while the 
defendant is imprisoned or on parole"). After years on the bench, the judge was 
presumably cognizant of the potential benefits flowing from successful completion of a 
drug-treatment program. However, he was also cognizant of the length and severity of 
defendant's habit and his on-going, losing struggles with the criminal justice system. 
Acknowledging his own "conflict" in deciding how best to deal with defendant in 
light of the information before him, and noting that all he had before him to indicate 
defendant's desire to break his long-term drug habit was defendant's own statement, the 
judge found the totality of the factors weighed in favor of prison (R. 168:7-8, 10-11). 
Additionally, he explained that he reduced the fines and sentences and "made them 
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concurrent to Judge Christiansen's sentence so that [defendant] can get credit" for his 
time served so that he may be released sooner (R. 168:11-12). The judge was clearly 
cognizant of his ability to fashion an appropriate sentence and to run all the sentences 
concurrently, and his sentencing decision represents his considered best efforts to balance 
all the competing factors with defendant's stated desire for rehabilitation and a new, 
productive life. 
The judge rendered his sentencing decision after personally observing and 
listening to defendant, reviewing and considering defendant's criminal history and his 
conduct in this case, and weighing all the information before him. Under the 
circumstances at hand, although defendant would have preferred probation, it cannot be 
said that "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court" in 
sentencing defendant to prison. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
Consequently, defendant's claim of sentencing error fails. 
2. Ineffective assistance and plain error. 
Defendant also couches his argument in terms of ineffective assistance and plain 
error. He argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 
specifically detail for the court the statutory factors relating to concurrent sentencing and 
the benefits of the drug treatment program. Aplt. Br. at 9-11. He claims the trial court 
committed plain error by "failing to correct the attorney's error[s]." Id. at 2, 10-11. He 
suffered prejudice from the inaction of both his counsel and the sentencing court, he 
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claims, because proper presentation and consideration of the factors would have resulted 
in probation or concurrent sentencing. Id. at 8, 11. 
As explained, infra, the sentencing judge was aware of the relevant factors to be 
considered in sentencing, and his consideration of those factors was obvious in his 
comments from the bench. He also heard from the defense concerning defendant's 
involvement in a drug-treatment program, including defendant's desire to succeed at the 
program and to turn his life around. The fact that he considered probation as a sentencing 
alternative in this case indicates that he understood the possible benefits of the program if 
defendant was truly committed to kicking his habit. Where the judge already had and 
utilized the information in making his sentencing determination, defense counsel's 
reiteration of the same information to the sentencing judge would have been redundant, 
and his failure to do so did not amount to deficient performance. 
Where there was no deficiency in the information put before the sentencing court, 
the judge cannot have committed plain error in failing to seek from defense counsel 
information which the court already possessed. See State v. Ricketts, 2004 UT App 92, \ 1 
n.l (unpublished memorandum decision) (holding that where counsel's conduct was not 
ineffective, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to correct the alleged 
failure of the defense attorney) (attached in Addendum D pursuant to Grand County v. 
Rogers, 2002 UT 25,116, 44 P.3d 734 (unpublished memorandum decisions may be 
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presented to appellate courts as persuasive authority so long as all parties and the court 
are supplied with an accurate copy of the decisions at the time the decision is first cited)). 
Moreover, defendant suffered no prejudice from his counsel's failure to provide 
redundant information to the sentencing court. The sentencing judge considered the 
statutory and rehabilitative factors in reaching his sentencing decision and found that 
defendant's criminal record and his conduct in this case outweighed the other factors and 
required imprisonment. He did not sentence defendant to the maximum possible 
sentence, and he explained that he intentionally crafted the sentence to reduce the fines 
and the time defendant would be likely to spend in prison (R. 168:11-12). His desire that 
defendant spend some time in prison was accomplished by use of the consecutive running 
of the sentences in these two cases. Additional emphasis of the information already 
considered by the judge in making his determination is not reasonably likely to have 
resulted in a more favorable decision. Absent prejudice, defendant's claims of ineffective 
assistance and plain error both fail. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 
1989) (both ineffective assistance and plain error claims require a showing of prejudice or 
harm, to the extent that an appellate court's confidence in the outcome is undermined); 
see also Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 31 n. 14 ("Because the defendant must show prejudice 
to prevail under either argument, the 'common standard' merely functions as an analytical 
shortcut that avoids treatment of the other prongs of the ineffective assistance and plain 
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error standards."); see also Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, *! 38 ("failure to satisfy either prong 
will result in our concluding that counsel's behavior was not ineffective."). 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court's ruling was based on consideration of the proper statutory 
factors, including the presentence report and defendant's statements to the court at 
sentencing, and the sentence was clearly within the limits proscribed by law, and 
defendant fails to establish either ineffective assistance or plain error, the State 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisc^jHiay of November, 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
IS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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^ J ^ 3 a y of November, 2005. 
Addenda 
Addendum A 
i m n u ^ Ax\i» s r JbCl lL . FRO VISIONS ON SENTENCES 
7 6 - 3 — 4 0 1 . Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition 
1) ^ court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
n one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
ler of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
ach other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutive-
r with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
I) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecu-
ly, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
iber of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
mdant. 
) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
iss the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
Id be inappropriate. 
) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
ences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
)le shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
mces are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
e criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
entences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
ided under Subsection (6)(b). 
b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct 
•hich occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
:>) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
*e committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
:) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
sent sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, 
the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his 
al sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effe 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the B 
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the va 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum ten 
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurr 
ly with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be1 ser 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or lengtl 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validit 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actu 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a cour 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, " imprisoned" means sentenced and commil 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 , the sentence 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless 
where the person is located. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989 c 181 § 1- L-
1994, c. 13, § 21; Laws 1995, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997 c 283 § 1 
May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 275, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, c 129 § 1 eff J 
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Appellate Case No. 20050141 
Appellate Case No. 20050142 
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BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 13TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 
2004, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTERS CAME ON FOR HEARING BEFORE THE 
HONORABLE A. LYNN PAYNE, SITTING AS JUDGE IN THE ABOVE-NAMED 
COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS CAUSE, AND THAT THE FOLLOWING 
PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE STATE: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
STEPHEN D. FOOTE 
DEPUTY DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
MAREA A. DOHERTY 

































P R O C E E D I N G S 
MS. DOHERTY: ATTORNEY DOHERTY WITH MR. MCGINNIS. WE 
WOULD REQUEST THAT AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE RECOMMENDATION MADE 
BY AP&P IS GENEROUS. AND THAT MR. MCGINNIS RECOGNIZES HIS PAST 
HISTORY AND IS GRATEFUL FOR THE OPPORTUNITY AND HOPES THAT YOU 
WILL GRANT HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO THE PROBATION AND COMPLETE 
THE CATS PROGRAM AND DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO ABIDE BY THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WERE MADE IN THE REPORT SUCH THAT HE WOULD 
STAY INCARCERATED AND COMPLETE THE CATS PROGRAM, COMPLETE ANY 
AFTER CARE, CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE AP&P DRUG CLAUSES. EVERYTHING 
THAT HAS BEEN ENUMERATED IN THIS REPORT IS SOMETHING THAT THE 
DEFENDANT IS GRATEFUL FOR THEIR RECOMMENDATION. HE HAS A LENGTHY 
CRIMINAL HISTORY, HE UNDERSTANDS THAT HE'S MADE A NUMBER OF 
ERRORS IN JUDGMENT, BUT HE FINALLY GETS IT AND HE IS 
PARTICIPATING WHOLEHEARTEDLY IN THE DRUG PROGRAM AND IS MAKING 
THE CHANGES THAT HE NEEDS TO MAKE IN HIS LIFE. HE'S EXPRESSED A 
SINCERE GOAL TO COMPLETE THIS PROGRAM. AND, IN FACT, IDENTIFY 
AND ACCOMPLISH GOALS IN HIS OWN LIFE. HE CONTINUES TO HAVE A 
RELATIONSHIP ONGOING BENEFICIAL WITH HIS EX-WIFE IN ORDER TO BE 
ABLE TO SEE HIS TWO KIDS. HE IS LOOKING TOWARDS MAKING AMENDS 
FOR WHAT HE HAS DONE IN THE PAST AND WOULD VERY SPECIFICALLY 
REQUEST THAT YOU FOLLOW THAT RECOMMENDATION MADE BY AP&P AND 
GRANT HIM THE PRIVILEGE OF PROBATION AND THE PRIVILEGE TO 


























THE COURT: MR. FOOTE. 
MR. FOOTE: YOU KNOW, I MUST ADMIT, YOUR HONOR, THAT MR. 
MCGINNIS TODAY LOOKS MUCH BETTER THAN I'VE SEEN HIM IN THE PAST. 
UNFORTUNATELY I CAN'T IGNORE THE PAST EITHER. AS I READ THROUGH 
THE - THROUGH THE REPORT HERE I NOTICE THAT THE PROGRAMS THAT 
THEY'RE RECOMMENDING AND THE OTHER THINGS UNTIL I GET TO THE 
CRIMINAL HISTORY, WHICH IS ONE OF THE WORST I'VE EVER SEEN, WHICH 
IS MY CONCERN. HIS PROBATION AND PAROLE HISTORY, HE WAS AFFORDED 
SIX OPPORTUNITIES FOR PAROLE, EACH ONE RESULTING IN REVOCATION 
AND CONTINUED DRUG USE OR COMMITTING NEW OFFENSES AND SERVED OUT 
HIS PRISON TIMES. HE HAS CRIMES CONVICTED FROM AUGUST OF THIS 
YEAR. AND THAT'S WHERE THEY GOT HIM INTO THE PROGRAM SO I'M 
ASSUMING THAT HE'S IN RIGHT NOW. UNFORTUNATELY I WOULDN'T FOLLOW 
THE RECOMMENDATION OF AP&P IN THIS CASE. IT'S A CASE WHERE TIME 
AND TIME AGAIN HE'S BEEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY AND TIME AND TIME 
AGAIN HE HAS FAILED THAT OPPORTUNITY AND HAS CONTINUED TO USE 
DRUGS, EVEN WHILE OUT ON RELEASE IN THESE CASES THAT WE HAVE 
BEFORE US TODAY. THE RECOMMENDATION THAT I BELIEVE WOULD BE 
APPROPRIATE WOULD BE FOR PRISON ON THE FELONIES CONSECUTIVE TO 
WHATEVER HE'S ALREADY HAD ORDERED. 
THE COURT: LET'S HEAR FROM YOU. 
MR. MCGINNIS: YES, SIR. I'D LIKE TO APOLOGIZE FOR NOT 
MAKING IT UP HERE. I REMEMBER WHEN I WAS BEFORE YOU LAST YOU 
WANTED TO SEE IF I COULD COME UP WITH A REASON FOR NOT BEING HERE 



























COURT FOR NOT BEING HERE. IN JUST THE COUPLE OF WEEKS I'VE BEEN 
IN THE PROGRAM - ACTUALLY SINCE I'VE BEEN IN JAIL SINCE AUGUST 
I'VE DECIDED TO NOT USE DRUGS. THAT COME TO THE CONCLUSION NO 
MATTER WHAT HAPPENS TO ME. BEING IN PRISON AS MUCH AS I'VE BEEN 
IN PRISON I NEVER HAD NO OPPORTUNITY - EXCUSE ME - I'VE HAD THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO BETTER MYSELF, WHICH I DIDN'T KNOW HOW TO DO. THE 
CATS PROGRAM SINCE I'VE BEEN IN THERE A COUPLE OF WEEKS HAS 
ALREADY GAVE ME SOME TOOLS TO TRY TO STRAIGHTEN OUT MY THINKING 
ERRORS AND - AND PROGRESS INTO A BETTER PERSON. AND - YOU KNOW 
NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENS IT'S GOING TO HAPPEN. I HOPE I DON'T GO 
TO PRISON. I HOPE I GET A - YOU KNOW - I MEAN I'LL PROBABLY HAVE 
TO GO TO SALT LAKE AND COMPLETE THAT SENTENCE THERE ANYWAY, BUT -
YOU KNOW - LIKE MY ATTORNEY SAYS, WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO 
PROVE TO, NOT JUST MYSELF, MY CHILDREN. WHICH I WAS OUT USING -
YOU KNOW - I MEAN I WASN'T A PARENT. I WASN'T A FRIEND. I 
WASN'T A SON. THERE'S A LOT OF THINGS I COULD GO ON AND EXPLAIN 
IN MY LIFE THAT I HAVE NO EXPLANATION FOR, EUT I - I BELIEVE IN 
MYSELF AND I HOPE THE COURT WOULD BELIEVE IN ME ONE MORE TIME 
BECAUSE DOWN IN SALT LAKE THEY PUT IT TO ME. THEY GIVE ME TEN 
YEAR CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES AND I'M NOT - YOU KNOW - AND THAT'S 
NOT WHY I'M DOING WHAT I'M DOING. I'M DOING WHAT I'M DOING 
BECAUSE I FINALLY GREW UP. I FINALLY HAVE THE WILLINGNESS AND I 
FINALLY HAVE THE ESTEEM TO BETTER MYSELF AND I'M GOING TO DO 
THAT. AND I JUST HOPE THAT - YOU KNOW - I HOPE YOU GIVE ME THE 


























GOT MYSELF - AND THE COURT-DIDN'T ORDER THIS PROGRAM, I DID THIS 
ON MY OWN. I THINK THE LADY IN THE PAROLE DEPARTMENT IS SAYING I 
NEED - YOU KNOW - FOR THE COURTS TO MAKE IT A STIPULATION I 
COMPLETE THE PROGRAM, WHICH IS FINE, BUT I DONE THIS ALL ON MY 
OWN EVEN BEFORE I CAME HERE. AND I WAS TRYING TO DO THAT WHEN I 
WAS OUT. DRUGS IS A POWERFUL THING AND IT REALLY IS AND I'M GLAD 
I'M OFF THE STUFF. I'M GLAD I GOT RESCUED AND THAT'S WHY I'M -
THAT'S WHY I CAN TALK TO YOU THE WAY I'M TALKING TO YOU NOW 
BECAUSE I'M NOT TRYING TO HIDE ANYTHING. BEFORE I WAS TRYING TO 
HIDE SOMETHING TO GO GET HIGH AND I DON'T WANT TO GET HIGH NO 
MORE. I DON'T. AND - YOU KNOW - PRISON HASN'T HELPED ME IN 22 
YEARS, IT'S NOT GOING TO HELP ME, I'M GOING TO DO IT MYSELF. AND 
THAT'S ALL I HAVE TO SAY, AND LIKE I SAY, I APOLOGIZE FOR NOT 
GETTING THIS MATTER TAKEN CARE OF A YEAR AGO BECAUSE I WOULDN'T 
BE IN SALT LAKE COUNTY IF I DID. AND - YOU KNOW - I'M THE ONE 
PAYING FOR IT. AND IF I MAY, IF I DIDN'T FEEL THE WAY I DID I 
WOULDN'T STAND IN FRONT OF YOU - I GOT INTO A 12-STEP GROUP. I'M 
A LEADER IN THE 12-STEP GROUP. BEFORE I WAS ALWAYS A FOLLOWER. 
I'M LEADING MY 12-STEP GROUP BECAUSE I FEEL THAT I CAN HELP 
SOMEONE AND I'VE TRIED TO HELP MYSELF - BETTER MYSELF AND I'M 
DOING A GOOD JOB. YOU KNOW, NO MATTER WHEN I - WHEN I LEAVE HERE 
I'M NOT GOING TO BE ANGRY, I'M GOING TO BE HAPPY BECAUSE I'M 
GOING TO BETTER MYSELF AND - YOU KNOW - I HOPE YOU GIVE ME THE 
OPPORTUNITY. 

























SITUATIONS WHERE THERE'S SOME EMOTIONAL REASONS TO DEAL WITH YOU 
IN A WAY THAT IGNORES YOUR PAST RECORD. I LIKED A COUPLE OF 
THINGS YOU SAID REAL WELL BECAUSE YOU HAVE BEEN IN CORRECTIONAL 
SETTINGS FOR MOST OF YOUR LIFE AND YOU HAVE FAILED IN EVERY 
CONCEIVABLE WAY. YOU'VE HAD PROBATION. YOU'VE HAD PAROLE. 
YOU'VE HAD PROGRAMS. AND YOU KEEP COMING BACK TO THE COURT 
REPEATEDLY. YOU'RE 42 YEARS OF AGE. YOU'VE SAID TO ME THAT NO 
MATTER WHAT HAPPENS TODAY YOU'RE GOING TO ACCEPT IT AND GO ON. 
THAT IS BECAUSE YOU TELL ME YOU HAVE MADE A DECISION TO NOT USE 
ANY DRUGS ANY MORE. THIS GOES BACK - YOUR RECORD GOES BACK - YOU 
HAVE A HORRIBLE RECORD EVEN AS A JUVENILE. YOU'RE 42 YEARS OLD 
SO I GUESS YOU WERE BORN IN WHAT YEAR? *62. AND SO YOUR RECORD 
STARTS WHEN YOU'RE - IN *74 AND JUST CONTINUES TO GO RIGHT 
THROUGH THE JUVENILE UP TO THE ADULT SYSTEM. YOU'VE BEEN 
CONVICTED AND SENT TO JAIL THREE TIMES I THINK ON THREE DIFFERENT 
OCCASIONS AND YOU HAVE BEEN OFFERED PAROLE ON OCCASIONS AND YOU 
HAVE VIOLATED YOUR PAROLE IN COMING OUT. YOU FAILED TO APPEAR IN 
THIS CASE, AND AS YOU MENTIONED, WHEN YOU FAILED TO APPEAR YOU 
WERE ALSO USING, AND BECAUSE OF THAT YOU WERE STOPPED AND HAVE 
ACTUALLY GONE TO TRIAL AND HAD THE MATTER SET FORTH AND SENTENCED 
IN THE SALT LAKE MATTERS BEFORE YOU ARRIVED HERE FOR SENTENCE ON 
A MATTER THAT TOOK PLACE BEFORE. 
I THINK WHOEVER HAS THE CELL PHONE IF THEY COULD GO 
OUT. I'M TRYING TO CONDUCT BUSINESS HERE. 



























THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. 
I THOUGHT ABOUT THIS A LOT. I HAVE GREAT - AND I'VE 
BEEN PUT IN A POSITION BY JUDGE CHRISTIANSEN'S DECISION AND THE 
PROBATION OFFICERS DECISION TO RECOMMEND PROBATION, BUT ALL I 
REALLY HAVE AT THIS POINT IN TIME IS YOUR REPRESENTATION THAT YOU 
HAVE TURNED THE CORNER. AND WHILE YOU'RE IMPRESSIVE, PUT UP 
AGAINST YOUR PRIOR RECORD, AND GIVEN THE FACT THAT I'M SURE THAT 
YOU'VE MADE THOSE REPRESENTATIONS IN THE PAST. IN FACT, YOU 
TALKED ABOUT CONNING YOUR - YOUR PROBATION OFFICER IN THE PAST. 
WHAT I DO KNOW IS THAT THROUGHOUT YOUR LIFE YOU HAVE NOT OBEYED 
THE LAW. YOU DIDN'T OBEY THE LAW IN THIS CASE. YOU DIDN'T COME 
OUT AND KEEP YOUR COURT APPEARANCE. YOU WERE ON PAROLE AT THE 
TIME - NO, YOU WERE NOT ON PAROLE AT THE TIME. YOU ARE NOT ON 
PAROLE; IS THAT TRUE? 
MS. DOHERTY: NOT ON PAROLE. 
MR. MCGINNIS: NO, I WASN'T. 
THE COURT: THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE BY THE WAY. I'M 
GLAD TO CLARIFY THAT. DO YOU ADMIT TO THAT, THAT HE WASN'T ON 
PAROLE? 
MR. FOOTE: ON PAROLE WHEN THESE OFFENSES OCCURRED? 
THE COURT: UH HUH. (AFFIRMATIVE) 
MR. FOOTE: HE WAS NOT. HE WAS - HE ACTUALLY SERVED OUT 
THE REST OF HIS TIME ON HIS LAST CHARGES AND WAS DISCHARGED FROM 
THE PRISON SO THERE WAS NO MORE PAROLE. 


























MR. MCGINNIS: SEPTEMBER 2001. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. FOOTE: I BELIEVE - THAT SOUNDS CORRECT OF WHEN HE 
WAS DISCHARGED. 
THE COURT: SO THE QUESTION I HAVE TO ASK MYSELF IS AM I 
WILLING TO IGNORE EVERYTHING HERE AND ACCEPT THE RECOMMENDATION 
AND YOUR STATEMENT THAT THAT'S ALL BEHIND YOU, AND I GUESS I'M 
NOT. 
HOW LONG WERE YOU IN JAIL HERE IN UINTAH COUNTY? 
MR. MCGINNIS: ALL TOGETHER I THINK MAYBE THREE OR FOUR 
MONTHS. 
COUNTY? 
THE COURT: DID YOU BOND OUT ON YOUR CASE HERE IN UINTAH 
MR. MCGINNIS: YES, SIR, TWICE. 
THE COURT: SO WHEN YOU WERE - YOU - YOU WERE RELEASED 
FROM JAIL AND YOU WENT TO SALT LAKE AND DIDN'T RETURN AND THEN 
YOU WERE ARRESTED ON THIS WARRANT AS WELL AS THE OTHER WARRANT IN 
SALT LAKE. 
MR. MCGINNIS: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: AND YOU RECEIVED CREDIT FOR THE TIME SERVED 
IN SALT LAKE TOWARDS THAT SENTENCE? 
MR. MCGINNIS: YES. HE GAVE ME A HUNDRED DAYS. 



























MR. MCGINNIS: YES. 
THE COURT: YOU KNOW, I JUST - I'VE BEEN THINKING ABOUT 
THIS AND WHEN I READ THE PRESENTENCE REPORT I SAID TO MYSELF AND 
MADE A NOTE I DON'T KNOW HOW I'M GOING TO NOT SEND THIS GUY TO 
PRISON BASED UPON ALL OF THE RECORD BECAUSE AFTER ALL WE ONLY 
HAVE YOUR STATEMENT AS TO WHAT YOU INTEND TO DO. AND BELIEVE ME, 
I'VE HEARD THEM ALL AND YOUR STATEMENT ACTUALLY IS BELIEVABLE, 
BUT I NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT I CAN'T IGNORE THE REALITY OF THE 
RECORD AND THE HAPPY THOUGHT THAT SOMEBODY HAS FINALLY TURNED THE 
CORNER. 
MR. MCGINNIS: I UNDERSTAND. 
THE COURT: WHAT ARE YOU SERVING IN SALT LAKE THEN? 
MR. MCGINNIS: I'VE GOT A YEAR THERE. I JOINED THE CATS 
PROGRAM WITH A $750 FINE AND 36 MONTHS PROBATION AND PAROLE. AND 
AFTERCARE - LIKE AFTERCARE THERE'S A - THE PROGRAM IS A SIX MONTH 
PROGRAM. THEN THERE'S ALSO SIX MONTHS AFTERCARE WHICH IS 
INTENSIVE AFTERCARE AND THEN THREE MONTHS FOLLOW-UP AFTERCARE. 
SO IT'S ACTUALLY LIKE A YEAR - IT'S AN 18 MONTH PROGRAM AND I 
HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL THAT AND I HAVE TO PAY FOR IT MYSELF. 
THERE'S UA'S THREE OR FOUR TIMES A WEEK. UPON THE COMPLETION THE 
COUNSELORS THERE STATED THAT THEY WILL WRITE JUDGE CHRISTIANSEN, 
AND I NEED TO GET MY CASE NUMBER HERE, AND IF I'M ALLOWED TO 
COMPLETE THE PROGRAM THEY WILL SEND YOU A LETTER UPON COMPLETION. 
AND THEN LIKE I STATE THEY - THEY DO AFTERCARE AND - YOU KNOW -


























KNOW - I CAN UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION. MY PAST HAS BEEN PRETTY 
HORRIBLE, BUT IT'S NOTHING LIKE MY FUTURE - YOU KNOW - I'VE | 
FINALLY GROWN UP AND - YOU KNOW - I HOPE I GET THE OPPORTUNITY To| 
PROVE TO MYSELF THAT - YOU KNOW - IT WASN'T ALL IN VAIN GROWING 
UP BECAUSE I CAN'T LOOK FORWARD - I MEAN I'M LOOKING FORWARD TO ; 
IT, BUT - | 
THE COURT: WELL, THAT WILL BE UP TO YOU. THAT WILL BE 
UP TO YOU. IF YOU'RE SUGGESTING THAT YOU'RE GOING TO GET 
DISCOURAGED IF YOU GO TO PRISON AND YOU MIGHT NOT REHABILITATE 
YOURSELF THEN -
MR. MCGINNIS: NO, SIR. I'M - I'M HAPPY - I'M HAPPY 
I'VE GROWN UP. I MEAN THAT'S WHAT I - I'M HAPPY I'VE GROWN UP 
AND I LOOK FORWARD TO IT. I REALLY DO. THAT'S WHY I SAY, NO 
MATTER WHAT HAPPENS I'M LOOKING FORWARD TO IT. 
THE COURT: I'M GLAD AFTER ALL THESE YEARS THAT I COULD 
AT LEAST ENTERTAIN THE THOUGHT OF GIVING YOU PROBATION. I THINK 
THAT IS A HAPPY OBSERVATION ABOUT THE STATE OF MY OWN SOUL THAT I 
HAVEN'T GROWN SO TAINTED, BUT I'M NOT GOING TO GIVE YOU 
PROBATION. 
FOR THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IT WILL BE A SENTENCE ZERO TO 
FIVE YEARS AT THE STATE PENITENTIARY AND A FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$500. 
I'M REDUCING ALL THESE FINES. I'M GOING TO MAKE ALL OF 



























FOR DRIVING ON A DENIED LICENSE THERE WILL BE A FINE OF 
$100 AND TEN DAYS IN JAIL. 
FOR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA IT WILL BE A FINE 
OF $100 AND SIX MONTHS IN JAIL. 
FOR - IN CASE NUMBER 147, FOR ATTEMPTED POSSESSION WITH 
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IT WILL BE A FINE IN 
THE AMOUNT OF $500 AND ONE YEAR IN JAIL. 
FOR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, $100 FINE AND SIX 
MONTHS IN JAIL. 
FOR FOLLOWING ANOTHER VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY, A CLASS C 
MISDEMEANOR, SIX MONTHS - EXCUSE ME - $50 FINE AND NINETY DAYS IN 
JAIL. 
FOR NO PROOF OF INSURANCE, $100 FINE AND NINETY DAYS IN 
JAIL. 
FOR DRIVING ON A DENIED LICENSE, $100 FINE AND NINETY 
DAYS IN JAIL. 
THESE TWO SENTENCES WILL BE CONSECUTIVE ONE WITH 
ANOTHER AND CONCURRENT TO THE SENTENCES THAT JUDGE CHRISTIANSEN 
HAS IMPOSED. 
I WISH AS I OFTEN DO THAT I KNEW THAT I WAS DOING THE 
RIGHT THING. I'LL CONFESS TO YOU THAT I HAVE GREAT CONFLICT AS 
TO WHETHER OR NOT THIS IS THE RIGHT THING TO DO. BUT AFTER 
LOOKING AT YOUR RECORD AND AFTER LOOKING WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS 
CASE MY MIND HAS OVERCOME MY HEART AND I THINK THAT THIS IS AN 


























THEM CONCURRENT TO JUDGE CHRISTIANSEN'S SENTENCE SO THAT YOU CAN 
GET CREDIT. YOU DON'T HAVE TO COME OUT OF JAIL AND START HIS 
OVER AGAIN. DON'T GET OUT OF PRISON THAT IS. MY OWN - ONE OF 
THE FACTORS THAT I TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION IS THAT I WOULD 
PROBABLY GIVE YOU MORE TIME HERE IN UINTAH COUNTY JAIL THAN I 
WOULD THAN YOU WOULD HAVE TO SPEND IN THE STATE PRISON GIVEN THE 
SITUATION OUT AT THE PRISON. 
MY DESIRE FOR YOU IN YOUR LIFE IS THAT YOU DO MEAN WHAT 
YOU'VE SAID AND THAT YOU ARE CAPABLE OF OVERCOMING THIS 
DISAPPOINTMENT WHICH I KNOW THAT YOU'RE FEELING AT THIS TIME AND 
THAT YOU CAN GO FORWARD AND DEAL WITH YOUR LIFE ON A PRODUCTIVE 
BASIS. 
GOOD LUCK. 
MS. DOHERTY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
(WHEREUPON THE FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.) 
STATE OF UTAH 





I, MELINDA ROLLINS, CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER, DO 
HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I RECEIVED THE ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED DISC 
IN THE MATTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF, VERSUS DOUGLAS 
TROY MCGINNIS, DEFENDANT, AND HAVE TRANSCRIBED THE SAME INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THE FOREGOING PAGES, NUMBERED FROM 1 TO 12, 
INCLUSIVE, TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, CONSTITUTE A FULL, TRUE AND 
CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION, EXCEPT WHERE IT IS INDICATED THE RECORDED 
COURT PROCEEDINGS WERE INAUDIBLE. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL AT VERNAL, UINTAH. 
COUNTY, UTAH THIS / p H DAY OF cAfVN jj) , 2005. 




4393 South 2600 East 
Vernal. Utah 84078 
My Commission Expires 
January 26,2008 
State of Utah 
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Addendum C 
KAREN ALLEN #7454 
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
STEPHEN D. FOOTE #8945 
DEPUTY DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 206 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
(435) 738-0184 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT 
—oooOooo— 
STATE OF UTAH, : AMENDED JUDGMENT AND 
COMMITMENT ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. Criminal No. 031800097 and 031800147 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
DOUGLAS TROY McGINNIS : 
Defendant. : 
—oooOooo— 
Criminal No. 031800097 
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (METHAMPHETAMINE) -
A THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
DRIVING ON SUSPENDED OR REVOKED OPERATOR'S LICENSE - A CLASS C 
MISDEMEANOR 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR 
Criminal No. 031800147 
ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
(METHAMPHETAMINE) - A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR 
DRIVING ON SUSPENDED OR REVOKED OPERATOR'S LICENSE - A CLASS C 
MISDEMEANOR 
NO EVIDENCE OF SECURITY - A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR 
FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE - A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR 
^ FILED 
rt DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY. UTAH 
JAN 1 h 2CG5 
JOAf 
BY I 
The above-entitled cases came before the Court for sentencing on Monday, December 13, 
2004, the Honorable Judge A. Lynn Payne presiding. The defendant was present and was 
represented by his attorney, Marea A. Doherty. The State of Utah was represented by Stephen D. 
Foote, Deputy Duchesne County Attorney. The Court received and reviewed a Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report that had been prepared by Adult Probation and Parole. Statements were 
made by counsel for the parties and the defendant. 
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the file and record herein, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
Criminal No. 031800097 
That the defendant has been convicted by his own pleas of guilty of the offenses of 
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine), a Third Degree Felony, 
in violation of Section 58-37-8 UCA (1953) as amended; Driving on Suspended or Revoked 
Operator's License, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 53-3-227 UCA (1953) as 
amended; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of 
Section 58-37a-5 UCA (1953) as amended. 
Criminal No. 031800147 
That the defendant has been convicted by his own pleas of guilty of the offenses of 
Attempted Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine), a Class A 
Misdemeanor; in violation of Section 58-37-8 UCA (1953) as amended; Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor; in violation of Section 58-37a-5 UCA (1953) as 
amended; Driving on Suspended or Revoked Operator's License, a Class C Misdemeanor; 
in violation of Section 53-3-227 UCA (1953) as amended; No Evidence of Security, a Class C 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-12a-303.2 UCA (1953) as amended; and Following 
Too Close, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6-62(1) UCA (1953) as 
amended. 
Criminal No. 031800097 
That for the offense of Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance 
(Methamphetamine), a Third Degree Felony, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is 
sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of not to exceed five (5) years in the Utah State Prison, 
and pay a fine in the sum of $500. That for the offense of Driving on Suspended or Revoked 
Operator's License, a Class C Misdemeanor, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is 
sentenced to serve a term of 10 days in the Duchesne County Jail, and pay a fine in the sum of 
$100. That for the offense of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, it is 
hereby ordered that the defendant is sentenced to serve a term of 6 months in the Duchesne 
County Jail, and to pay a fine in the sum of $100. Said prison and jail sentences shall run 
concurrent with each other. 
Criminal No. 031800147 
That for the offense of Attempted Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance 
(Methamphetamine), a Class A Misdemeanor, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is 
sentenced to serve a term of one (1) year in the Duchesne County Jail, and to pay a fine in the 
sum of $500. That for the offense of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, it is hereby ordered to sentence a term of six (6) months in the Duchesne County 
Jail, and to pay a fine in the sum of $100. That for the offense of Driving on Suspended or 
Revoked Operator's License, a Class C Misdemeanor, it is hereby ordered that the defendant 
is sentenced to serve a term of 90 days in the duchesne County Jail, and to pay a fine in the sum 
of $100. That for the offense of No Evidence of Security, a Class C Misdemeanor, it is hereby 
ordered that the defendant is sentenced to serve a term of 90 days in the Duchesne County Jail, 
and to pay a fine in the sum of $100. That for the offense of Following Too Close, a Class C 
Misdemeanor, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is sentenced to serve a term of 90 days in 
the Duchesne County Jail, and to pay a fine in the sum of $50. Said jail sentences shall run 
concurrent with each other. 
The sentences in Criminal No. 031800097 and 031800147 shall run consecutive with 
each other, and both sentences shall run concurrent with the defendant's sentence from Judge 
Christiansen. The sentences herein for the misdemeanor charges shall be served at the Utah State 
Prison. The Court transfers jurisdiction over the misdemeanors to the Board of Pardons. 
Commitment shall be forthwith. 
The defendant is remanded to the Duchesne County Sheriff to be transported to the Utah 
State Prison. Thereafter, the defendant is remanded to the custody of the Board of Pardons. 
DATED this / 3 day of January, 2005. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT 
A. LYNN PAT 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
^JTUXAJUX A-
Marea A. Doherty 
Attorney for Defendant 
State of Utah vs Douglas Troy McGinnis 
Case No. 031800097 and 031800147 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of January, 2005,1 delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing proposed Amended Judgment and Commitment Order to the attorney for the 
defendant, at: 
Marea A. Doherty 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 399 
Duchesne UT 84021 
by depositing in her box at the Duchesne County Justice Center, Duchesne, Utah. 
Legal Assistant 
State of Utah vs Douglas Troy McGinnis 
Case No. 031800097 and 031800147 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the of January, 2005,1 delivered/mailed a true and 
correct copy of the Amended Judgment and Commitment Order to the attorney for the defendant, 
at: 
Marea A. Doherty 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 399 
Duchesne UT 84021 
by depositing in her box at the Duchesne County Justice Center, Duchesne, Utah, 
and to 
Adult Probation and Parole 
PO Box 1823 
Roosevelt UT 84066 
and to 
Utah State Prison 
Attn: Records 
PO Box 250 
Draper UT 84020 
by depositing in the U. S. Mail, Duchesne, Utah. 
Legal Assistant 
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Not Reported in P.3d5 2004 WL 639688 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 92 
(Cite as: 2004 WL 639688 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David Isaac RICKETTS, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20020800-CA. 
April 1,2004. 
Eighth District, Duchesne Department; The 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne. 
Julie George, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Christopher D. Ballard, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Greenwood. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
*1 David Ricketts (Defendant) appeals the trial 
court's sentencing order, alleging plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel. [FN1] 
FN1. Defendant argues that the trial court 
committed plain error "by 'let[ting] the 
failure of the defense attorney go by 
uncorrected.' " Because we do not hold 
that counsel's conduct was ineffective 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984), we necessarily rule that the trial 
court did not commit plain error in 
sentencing Defendant to prison. 
In reviewing counsel's performance, we look to the 
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41,K 25, 1 P.3d 546. 
Under Strickland, Defendant must first show that 
counsel's performance was "deficient ... in some 
demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's 
performance prejudiced [Defendant]." Carter v. 
Galetka, 2001 UT 96,1 31, 44 P.3d 626; see also 
Kelley, 2000 UT 41 at If 25, 1 P.3d 546. "Failure 
to satisfy either prong will result in our concluding 
that counsel's behavior was not ineffective." State v. 
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,1 38, 55 P.3d 1131. 
Because we conclude that counsel's performance 
was not deficient, we do not reach the prejudice 
prong of Strickland. See State v. Mecham, 2000 UT 
App 247,1f 21, 9 P.3d 777 (" '[B]ecause a 
defendant has the burden of meeting both parts of 
the Strickland test, it is unnecessary for this court to 
apply both parts where our inquiry reveals that one 
of its parts is not satisfied.' " (alteration in original) 
(quoting State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 315 (Utah 
1998))). 
To prove counsel's performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, Defendant 
"must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy." Strickland, 446 
U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (quotations and 
citations omitted). Therefore, "[i]n examining trial 
counsel's performance, '[w]e "indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]" 
' " Diaz, 2002 UT App 288 at f 39, 55 P.3d 1131 
(second alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel failed to (1) 
listen to or request the court to play a tape 
containing threats made by Defendant to kill Agent 
Draper and allow Defendant to explain the threats; 
and (2) obtain additional mitigating evidence, 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 2 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 639688 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 92 
(Cite as: 2004 WL 639688 (Utah App.)) 
including any favorable reports from the Wyoming App.), 2004 UT App 92 
probation department. Addressing the first prong of 
Strickland, we conclude that trial counsel's conduct END OF DOCUMENT 
was "well within the range of professionally 
reasonable judgements." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
699, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. First, accepting Agent 
Draper's testimony regarding the contents of the 
tape without listening or requesting the court to 
listen to it was acceptable trial strategy. Playing the 
tape may have been more prejudicial to Defendant 
than beneficial because it may have "reemphasized 
the threats ... in [a] more dramatic fashion." 
Moreover, the court gave Defendant an opportunity 
to respond to the allegations of threats on the tape 
and Defendant apologized and attempted to give an 
explanation. We hold that counsel's decision to 
accept Agent Draper's testimony regarding contents 
of the tape acceptable trial strategy. 
*2 Second, counsel's decision not to provide 
additional mitigating evidence was not per se 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Carter, 2002 
UT 96 at fh 33-34, 57 P.3d 1064 (finding 
counsel's performance did not fall below a standard 
of reasonable conduct because counsel "presented a 
substantial amount of mitigation evidence.... 
[Moreover, the defendant] had not shown what 
additional evidence was available to present to the 
jury"). 
Defendant's counsel provided a substantial amount 
of mitigating evidence on his behalf, including 
letters from family members, fellow WYSTAR 
patients, WYSTAR, and the WYSTAR Discharge 
Summary. As to the report from the Wyoming 
probation department, Defendant presented no 
evidence that such report existed. Counsel 
requested and the trial court granted a continuance 
to obtain the Wyoming report. Further, if the report 
existed, there is no evidence as to what the report 
contained. Therefore, we hold that counsel's 
performance was not deficient. Accordingly, we 
affirm. 
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge, and 
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 639688 (Utah 
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